Truth-Telling: An
Exercise In Practical Morality
By Charles Wellborn
[Dr. Charles Wellborn is Professor of
Religion Emeritus, Florida State University, Tallahassee and for 20
years was Dean of the Overseas Campus in London where he now lives.]
Any respectable list of aphorisms must
include the time-honored words, "Honesty is the best policy."
Most of us pay sincere lip-service to that admonition, but in everyday
life the translation of the words into action can often present a puzzling
challenge.
I was reared in a Christian home. Again and again my parents instructed me
always to tell the truth, and I was sometimes punished when I failed to do
so. I identified truth with the facts of the matter, insofar as I knew
them. The apocryphal tale of George Washington was a familiar story.
"I cannot tell a lie. I chopped down the cherry tree," the
future "Father of Our Country" declared, to the moral applause
of ensuing generations.
I began my formal schooling with a firm conviction that it was always
right to tell the truth, but I soon faced a worrying problem. Clearly, to
many of my fellows, there was something dishonorable and unmanly about
being a "tattle-tale"--telling the truth about some less than
honorable act committed by another person. Thus arose one of my first
small moral dilemmas. Was it more virtuous always to tell the truth or
tactfully to hold one's tongue in certain situations? That this was not
just a childish problem was driven home to me in my later years as a
college professor when I witnessed students struggle seriously with the
decision as to whether to report another student for cheating on an
examination.
American high schools, in my day, usually presented a "junior"
and a "senior" play each year (some may still do so). I played a
small part in my senior play. The play was a popular potboiler entitled
"Nothing But the Truth." The slender plot revolved around a
decision by a group of people to speak nothing but the truth--the
facts--for a specified period of time. As the play progressed, scenes of
comedy, chaos, and even tragedy were depicted, all as the result of rigid
"truth-telling."
My role in that play did not make me a theatrical star but it did start
some wheels turning in my mind. Is honesty always the best policy? Is it
universally wrong to tell a lie, regardless of the consequences? Are there
such things as "white lies" which are morally acceptable, in
contrast to other lies which are not?
Some years after my high school days I became a soldier in the United
States Army during World War II. As part of my military training, I was
told that, if I should be captured, I was obliged under the Geneva
Convention to tell the enemy only my name, rank, and serial number. in
certain circumstances it would enemy with false information. As a simple
illustration, if I were to be asked about the rate of casualties in my
unit, it would be acceptable for me to say that the rate was very low,
even if, in fact, more than half of my unit had been killed or wounded in
recent fighting. This, I was told, would be a "useful lie." Are
"useful lies" morally acceptable?
I have dredged up these random reflections from my own experience in order
to make the important point that "truth-telling," as a practical
moral exercise, is often far from simple. Christians regard the Old
Testament Decalogue as a God-given and dependable basis for moral conduct.
The ninth commandment tells us that we are not to bear false witness
against our neighbor. At this point we are faced with the inevitable
problem of interpretation. The commandment is stated in human language.
What do the words mean, when applied to real-life situations? A narrow
understanding of the meaning of "bearing false witness" might be
that it forbids us to falsify facts when we are giving testimony under
oath in a court of law. But both Jews and Christians have understood the
commandment to extend much further, placing upon us the moral obligation
to tell the truth.
Does this understanding of the commandment relieve us of difficulty by
dictating a simple, pun complicated responsibility to tell the factual
truth under any and all circumstances? It would be comfortable to think
so, but my life experience leaves me with nagging problems. One of those
problems is the definition of truth. That, of course, is an age-old
question. Even Pontius Pilate asked, "What is truth?" Is there
more to truth than simply the replication of facts? And is the ninth
commandment our final moral authority in this area? What are we to do if
it seems that the obligation to tell the factual truth conflicts with
another commandment, such as that of Jesus that we should love our
neighbor as ourselves?
In the 18th century the philosopher, Immanuel Kant, dealt with the overall
moral problem involved in telling the truth. Relying mainly on
philosophical reasoning, he insisted that, indeed, truth is identical with
facts and, further, that woven into the moral fabric of the universe are
certain moral absolutes which he called "categorical
imperatives." One of those imperatives is the obligation to tell the
truth under any and all imaginable circumstances. His only concession was
to say that it may sometimes be acceptable to remain silent.
Ever since Kant ethicists have debated his conclusions. They have worried,
for instance, over a sample application of Kant's position. In modern
terms the situation is this. Suppose that you are in the front yard of
your house, trimming your hedge. Out of the next-door house runs your
neighbor's wife, obviously terrified. She dashes into your yard and hides
herself behind the hedge. Seconds later, she is followed by her husband,
brandishing a hatchet. He calls out to you, "Did you see my wife?
Where is she?"
The facts of the matter are clear. You do know where she is. Are you
obligated to tell him the truth? Kant would grant only that you have the
option to remain silent. Is that the good thing to do in this situation?
Would it possibly be better to point down the street and say, "She
went that way"? To say those words would be to lie, in terms of the
facts, but it might well give you time to get the wife into the safety of
your house and even to call the police. Of course, some "macho"
types might suggest that you tackle the irate husband and take the hatchet
away from him, but not all of us are supermen. I do not choose at this
point to try to solve that moral dilemma. I use the story simply to raise
questions.
Some thirty years ago an American theologian, Joseph Fletcher, published a
book which for a brief period caused a stir in religious circles. His book
was called Situation Ethics and it set forth the argument that what we
call moral absolutes are not absolute at all but only general moral
guidelines. Fletcher believed that every actual situation of moral choice
is almost completely unique. It is the context of action--the
"situation"--which dictates the "right" action. What
is good in one situation may be bad in another. Fletcher went on to argue
that, for the Christian, there is finally only one moral absolute--agape
love, the love which Jesus taught.
Fletcher's presentation left large logical gaps, and his critics were
quick to point those out. The overwhelming number of human moral decisions
are not nearly so unique as Fletcher believed. The similarities among
decisions are, by and large, more important than their supposed
uniqueness. Fletcher was accused of, in actuality, discarding almost
completely the moral wisdom of such dicta as the Ten Commandments. In
addition, he seemed to fail to take seriously the ingrained propensity of
men and women to interpret his sole absolute--love--in twisted and
perverse ways. It is not enough to instruct individuals to "do the
loving thing"; that command leaves people with a suspect and highly
subjective standard of right and wrong Fletcher's arguments faded into
obscurity, leaving only the term "situation ethics" as a sort of
"bete noire"--a convenient whipping post, especially for many
conservative moralists.
Several years before Fletcher another theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, had
raised more searching questions, specifically in the area of
truth-telling. Bonhoeffer took as his central concern the question,
"What is truth?" Is truth simply a replication of the facts or
is it something more than that? He sought to put the understanding of
truth within a larger context--the loving purposes of God in the world.
Well aware of human sinful tendencies, Bonhoeffer did not discard the
moral injunction that it is right to tell the truth. Rather, he refused to
identify truth with bare facts. Truth is always and everywhere, Bonhoeffer
thought, consistent with the compassionate purpose of God, as revealed in
Jesus Christ. To be totally "true", therefore, a word or act
must somehow be loving and redemptive.
Like Fletcher, Bonhoeffer argued (on far more solid ground, I think) that
the situation or context of action is important in determining the right
or wrong thing to do or say. No moral decision can be divorced from the
circumstances in which it is made. It is the concrete situation which
assists us in applying the love ethic of Jesus and in determining what is
redemptive in real-life decisions. Like Fletcher, Bonhoeffer insisted that
the final moral imperative is the command to love our neighbor as ourself.
But the moral wisdom of the Ten Commandments, for instance, is of
indispensable value, if we seek to act in accordance with the redemptive
purposes of God. The burden of proof is certainly on us when we decide to
depart from the facts of the matter.
How then do we arrive at the truth in a specific decision-making
situation? Bonhoeffer argued that one significant component of the truth
is that it must be "coherent" with the actualities of the
situation. To put this simply, if one is called on to answer a question,
it is important to try to understand what the questioner is actually
asking. Perhaps this idea can be clarified with some real-life examples,
one rather minor and oft-used, the other two more serious.
Suppose that you are a husband, greeting your wife who has just returned
from a shopping expedition. She is obviously excited and pleased. She goes
into the bedroom and shortly returns, having put on an expensive new dress
which is the fruit of her shopping. She models it before you and then
asks, "Do you like it?" In this particular situation, imagine
that you actually do not like the dress. In fact, you do not like it at
all. What do you say to your wife? Do you tell the truth--that is, give
her the facts?
Bonhoeffer suggests that it is important in this situation to understand
what the wife's question means. She obviously likes the dress; otherwise,
she would not have bought it. Is she asking for your honest opinion? Or is
she asking for your support for an action which she has already carried
out? Would any loving or redemptive purpose be served by your giving her
the full blast of your negative views?
Granted, the "right" answer will depend a great deal on the
personalities of the two people involved. If the relationship is such that
the husband knows that his actual opinion is important to the wife and
that she will have no real difficulty accepting that opinion, then it
might be best to give her the facts. My judgment is that there are many
marital relationships where more harm than good would be done by giving a
brutal, honest opinion.
In a more serious situation, consider a doctor attending a patient who is
terminally ill, according to all of the available medical knowledge. The
patient asks the doctor, "Am I going to die?" What does the
doctor say? Does he simply impart the tragic facts, or is there a morally
acceptable alternative?
I have discussed this situation with several of my Christian doctor
friends. I am impressed that in every case my friends have said, in one
way or another, "It would depend on the patient. It would depend on
the situation." They seem to be saying that an important factor in
their decision would be "What is the patient really asking?"
Some people would be asking for the bare facts of the matter, and they
should certainly be given those facts. But others are not asking for that.
They require some kind of support, some sort of hope, else their last days
may well be horrible and unbearable. Should not the sensitive, caring
physician frame his answer in a way that, even though it is not entirely
consistent with the facts, contributes redemptively and lovingly to the
welfare of his patient?
I would offer one other example which comes out of my experience years ago
as a pastor and counselor. A sincere, Christian young man, recently
married, came to his pastor for advice. He told me that, as a teen-ager,
long before his marriage, he had led a dissolute and promiscuous sexual
life. He had become a Christian, had repented his sexual sins, and felt
that God had forgiven him and wiped his moral slate clean. Now, his
conscience was troubled. Did he have a moral obligation to tell his wife
the whole truth about his past?
How would you have counseled this young man? Of course, again, a judgment
must be made, imperfect at best, as to the character of the persons
involved. Acting on my best judgment, my advice to the young husband was
that there was nothing to be gained, in terms of the supreme importance of
his relationship with his wife, by giving her all the facts. It seemed to
me that such a response might have done irrevocable damage to his
relationship. I did not think that his wife either wanted or needed to
know the "truth."
I realize how open to criticism I am at this point. There is the
possibility, remote but real, that at a later date, the wife may have
found out that her husband had not given her all the facts. But I gambled
on the belief that, even if that happened, the husband could justify his
action on the basis of his love for his wife and his overwhelming desire
to maintain the marriage relationship at its best. What seemed to me most
important in the situation was not the facts, but the persons involved.
Looking back, I feel more comfortable with my decision now, since that
particular marriage has happily endured for almost forty years.
I have used these simple illustrations to point up the fact that decisions
about "truth-telling" are not always simple and
straight-forward. Where does this leave us, as Christians? Are we totally
at sea when it comes to deciding whether or not to tell the
"truth"? I think not. First, it is clear we are not free to play
fast and loose with the facts. The ninth commandment is not only a basic
moral guideline, it is also an essential component of society. We could
not operate unless we were reasonably certain that, in all ordinary cases,
people told us the factual truth. Chaos would result if, when we asked
someone on the street what time it was, we had always to wonder whether
they deliberately gave us the wrong answer.
The law is essential in the operation of ordinary life. But this does not
allow for the extraordinary circumstances which sometimes present
themselves. Thus, there is a second basic proposition. The law, however
practical in ordinary circumstances, does not cover everything. Legalistic
adherence to the letter of the law is not sufficient. Here, Christians
must turn, as always, to the teaching of Jesus.
Clearly, Jesus finally put love above law. He said that he had come to
"fulfill" the law. To me, that means that he came to give the
law new meaning--a meaning that derives from the priority application of
"Jesus-love" to the dimensions of the law.
Jesus did not hesitate to violate the letter of the law if it conflicted
with the demands of love and compassion. He ignored the Sabbath law in
order to heal the sick and suffering. Even more significantly, in the case
of a woman taken in adultery, he put compassion first. The law prescribed
the penalty of death but Jesus defied the woman's self-righteous accusers
and said to her, "Go, and sin no more." He acted redemptively
and, thus, "fulfilled" the law.
Strict legalism always involves its practitioners in a maze of conflicting
demands and illogical conclusions. In a particular situation two or more
laws may seem to contradict one another. And to be certain of rigid
obedience to a law, its meaning and implications must be spelled out in
great detail, as with the Jewish regulations for Sabbath observance. In
practice, if not always in theory, this narrow stance, understanding that,
in the final analysis, living persons are more important than dead laws.
What I am suggesting here does not provide a simple method of making moral
decisions, either in the specific area of "truth-telling," or in
other situations of choice. Difficult judgments must be made. One must not
narrow the range of love or unrealistically individualize it. In the case
of a crime, for instance, God's love must be acted out, not only toward
the guilty criminal, but also toward the victim and, indeed, toward
society as a whole. The demands of justice must be factored into the moral
equation.
Doing the "loving" thing is, therefore, rarely easy and often
risky. One could argue that with the woman taken in adultery, Jesus took a
sort of moral gamble, trusting in the redemptive power of love and
forgiveness to make the woman a better person. There was no absolute
assurance of that actually happening. But Jesus obviously felt that the
risk was worth taking. Crucial moral decisions by Christians almost always
involve an element of risk, but I believe that we are called to be daring
in the name of love.
To return, finally, to our earlier Kantian illustration, I have decided
upon reflection that when the angry husband rushed out of his house, I
would have said to him, "She went that way," pointing in the
wrong direction. Factually, that would have been a lie. But I hope that I
am not self-righteous when I say that, at that moment, I believe Jesus
might have smiled.
Updated Thursday, December 28, 2000
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